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AbstrAct: The paper focuses on the traditional purpose of pre-trial 
detention (and other precautionary measures) to prevent specific 
risks. While liberty is the rule, before conviction, pre-trial detention is 
an absolute exception, competing with the opposite principle of the 
presumption of innocence: providing valuable and accurate justification 
for balancing the interest to prevent risk with the presumption of 
innocence is an overarching difficulty for judges, in the whole western 
world. Which the solutions? The paper reflects and compares the 
traditional solution of legal presumptions with the newer trend of 
actuarial assessment tools, based on psycho-criminological theories, 
based on the Italian and the US federal systems.
Key words: pre-trial detention; presumption of innocence; prediction; 
behavior; legal presumption; risk assessment.
AbstrAct: Lo scritto propone una riflessione che prende le mosse dalla funzione 
tradizionalmente assegnata alle misure cautelari, di prevenzione di specifici 
rischi endoprocedimentali. Se, infatti, la libertà dell’accusato è la regola, prima 
dell’accertamento definitivo della sua colpevolezza, la custodia cautelare – 
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come strumento estremo di limitazione della libertà personale – non può 
che essere l’assoluta eccezione, in costante tensione con la presunzione di 
innocenza. Pertanto, il difficile bilanciamento tra contrapposti interessi – 
presunzione di innocenza e svolgimento del processo – sfocia, a tutte le 
latitudini, nella necessità di fornire ampia e convincente motivazione alle 
decisioni cautelari. Quali gli strumenti per raggiungere tale obiettivo? Il 
lavoro pone in relazione la tradizionale soluzione delle presunzioni legali 
(di pericolosità) e i più recenti strumenti di risk assessment digitale per la 
valutazione del rischio di recidivanza e comportamento violento, in un 
parallelo che mette in relazione l’ordinamento italiano e quello statunitense.
Key words: custodia cautelare; presunzione di innocenza; previsione; 
comportamento; presunzioni legali; risk assessment.
summAry: 1. Introducing the topic – 2. The past and the future in 
criminal judicial decisions: traditional pre-trial detention scopes; 
2.1. and the new security purpose; 2.2. how judges can forecast 
the suspects’ future behavior? – 3. legal presumptions in pre-trial 
detention; 3.1. in Italy; 3.2. and in the U.S. federal order – 4. What 
else, instead of presumptions? 4.1. continental Europe and the 
German Moderne Schule; 4.2. The US and undetermined sentencing; 
4.3. the dawn of risk assessment tools; 4.4 pre-trial risk assessment 
tools: the PTra; 4.5. and the PSa – 5. conclusions.
1. IntroducIng the topIc
In the recent debate about the use of AI and computational 
models in the realm of justice, much attention has been paid to the alleged 
ability of such solutions to predict future events. Generally speaking, 
mathematical models are meant to represent a phenomenon (or a group 
of phenomena) in descriptive (or normative) terms, in order to allow a 
prediction of its future replication2: i.e. Having established how and when, 
given A (a specific condition), B (a specific consequence) occurs, a model 
allows to establish how likely it is that given a specific input, a specific 
2 ISRAEL, G., IANNELLI, M., Modellistica matematica, Enciclopedia Italiana 
Treccani, VI Appendice, Treccani, Roma, 2000.
1861
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 3, p. 1859-1896, set.-dez. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i3.633 |
output will be generated. Although a model is not the mirror of reality – 
as reality can be represented by several different models - it is possible 
to argue that models are meant to predict, statistically, the likelihood 
of an occurrence, based on the quantitative analysis of a phenomenon. 
This happens, more or less successfully, in major branches of research: 
mathematics, physics, medicine, climatology, economics, politics… In 
very general terms, wherever and whenever the quantitative approach 
proves relevant (i.e., reliable), a model can be tailored for the purpose 
to predict the outcome of a process.
The digital turn, based on the amazing boost in computational 
powers3, enlarged the possibility to realise accurate computational models, 
analysing large database, regularly updated, establishing more accurate 
correlations. In a nutshell, after the digital turn, computational models 
can more likely deliver accurate predictions… given that the phenomenon 
at issue can be reliably tackled with a quantitative approach. 
Actually, when human behaviour comes to the attention, the 
accuracy of the quantitative method is doubtful. While in certain areas 
of research, such as e.g. customers’ habits and decisions, the quantitative 
approach delivers useful patterns to predict marketing strategies4, other 
aspects of human behaviour are harder to standardise into patterns or, 
at least, the accuracy of the prediction is far lower5. Here is where the 
issue of the quantitative method, statistics, crosses the realm of justice 
and, in particular, of criminal justice, raising a huge number of questions. 
One general query is: Are there mathematical (and computational) 
models that can be usefully applied in the criminal proceedings decision-
making process? Given a general reluctance of legal scholarship towards 
statistics6, the quantitative approach is said to be consistent, while humans 
3 PAGALLO, U., Algo-Rithms and the Beat of the Legal Drum, in Philosophy 
and Technology, 2018, 1 ff.
4 See the seminal work of VON NEUMANN, J., MONRGENSTER, O., Theory of 
games and economic behavior, Princeton 1944.
5 With specific regard to this topic, see the seminal work of UNDERWOOD, B. 
D., Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Interference 
and Individualized Judgement, Yale Law Journal, 1979, vol. 88, 1409 ff.
6 WILLIAMS, J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial Detention Decisions under the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984; A Statistical Approach, American Criminal Law Review, 
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are not, because they have attitudes, which statistical methods have 
not…7 Without lingering upon the implications of this assumption, it is 
irrebuttable that statistics helps to identify and weight different factors 
relevant in a decision process, to confirm individual suspicions and, in 
particular, to allow others to replicate a decisional process8. For these 
reasons, statistics entered criminal courtrooms and made it into the 
criminal evidence system, whenever a probabilistic issue interferes 
into the causation chain. Nevertheless, there is a long-lasting distress 
in using class-generated probabilities to prove the liability or guilt of 
an individual9.
In particular, there is a more specific matter upon which we 
need to dwell: Are there aspects of the criminal proceedings decision-
making process in which there is need to forecast a human behaviour? 
As I pointed out in other occasions10, regardless the national jurisdiction, 
and despite the assumptions above, criminal proceedings and trials 
often depend upon predictions of the defendants’ future behaviour, 
that judges must deliver, although the law does not provide for a clear 
set of criteria (or, more often, without a complete set of information). 
Moreover, it was noted that the need to forecast a human behaviour 
within the context of justice implies not only a matter of accuracy – like 
in any branch of science – but also a matter of other competing values 
that cannot be overlooked, such as individuals’ autonomy11. Actually, 
accuracy appears to lose momentum, in relation to the individuals’ 
autonomy which, despite an extremely precise prediction, yet allows 
humans to choose to depart from a forecasted behaviour; but also, when 
it comes to the criminal setting, other values, such as the presumption 
1993, Vol. 30, p. 285.
7 WILLIAMS, J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial Detention, p. 286.
8 The topic reaches far beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, suf-
fice it to recall HOGART, R.M., Judgement and Choice, 2nd ed., Wiley, Hobo-
ken, p. 49.
9 UNDERWOOD, B. D., Law and the Crystal Ball, p. 1415.
10 QUATTROCOLO S., Artificial Intelligence, Computational Models and Crim-
inal Proceedings. A Framework for a European Legal Discussion, Springer, 
Cham, 2020, p. 131 ff.
11 UNDERWOOD, B. D., Law and the Crystal Ball, p. 414; 
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of innocence, the b.a.r.d., the public faith in the humanity of the legal 
system12, clash with accuracy.
Nevertheless, (and with some approximation between legal 
orders), it is possible to say that there are at least two crucial decisions 
based on predictions. The first and most general decision (because it comes 
with every conviction) is sentencing: depending upon the different theory 
(or theories) of punishment accepted by a legal order, a larger or smaller 
portion of sentence is based on the risk of reoffending. The reasons for 
this have been largely researched over the decades and the literature is 
burgeoning. In such panorama, the digital turn revitalised the debate upon 
the reliability of risk assessment tools, based on psycho-criminological 
theories. Especially in the overseas common law jurisdictions, the tradition 
in psycho-criminological studies brought to an early introduction of 
risk assessment tools, used in sentencing to establish rates of risk of 
reoffending, as briefly reported hereinafter (§4.2). The second and more 
specific context is that of pre-trial detention, under the spotlight in this 
paper. In fact, also at the pre-trial detention stage there is massive reliance 
upon forecasts by the judicial authority about the accused’s future conduct, 
regardless the national legal order. In such scenario, it is important to 
reflect upon this aspect: given the huge impact of prediction in the area 
of pre-trial detention, which is the room for computational models in 
guiding the judicial decision between liberty and detention (which is an 
absolute exception, at the pre-trial stage)? 
Based on the aim of answering this question (that is a specification 
of the original one ‘are there mathematical and computational models 
that can be usefully applied in the criminal proceedings decision-making 
process?’), the paper is structured upon the following steps: i) a brief 
overview on the most common reasons justifying pre-trial detention in 
the western legal culture; ii) the main different approaches to pre-trial 
detention in common law and in civil law countries, with specific regard 
to Italy; iii) the impact of prediction in pre-trial detention decisions; 
iv) the alternatives to tackle the demanding task of prediction: risk 
assessment tools, with specific regard to the U.S. Public Safety Assessment; 
12 TRIBE, L.H., Trial by mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal process, 
Harvard Law Rev., 1971, vol. 84, p. 1368 ff.
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v) presumptions of dangerousness, with specific regard to art. 275 co. 3 
of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure; vi) a comparative approach 
and some conclusions.
2. the past and the future In crImInal judIcIal decIsIons: 
tradItIonal pre-trIal detentIon scopes
Moving from the title of this paper, a crucial assumption for 
the topic under discussion is that «in almost no other circumstances is 
the court called upon to make predictions about future conduct rather 
than to determine and punish events which have taken place in the 
past».13 Actually, what appears to be a patent paradox is the basis for 
the whole discussion about the use of computational models in criminal 
justice decisions.
Every criminal proceeding pursues the goal of delivering a 
decision upon the charge against the defendants: assessing their acts 
and their personal responsibility for the offence occurred is the very 
purpose of any criminal proceeding, in any jurisdiction. The assessment 
of guilt beyond any reasonable doubt entails, at some conditions, the 
punishment of the convicted ones. However, in framing the boundaries 
of this discussion, two caveat are necessary. 
On the one hand, whereas the purpose of criminal proceedings 
is straightforward, there is no clear and general understatement of 
the purposes of punishment: the lack of consensus about the very 
function(s) of punishment appears in sentencing, in the most evident 
way.14 «Deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and dangerousness 
represent the main competing ideologies whose implications clash with 
each other».15 The whole philosophical debate about the aim of criminal 
sanctions is mainly influenced by the opposing ideas of retribution (based 
on rigorous proportionality between criminal act and sanction), and 
13 VOGLER, R., England and Wales, in S. Ruggeri (ed), Liberty and Security in 
Europe, Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, Göttingen, 2013, p. 88.
14 LACEY, N., State Punishment, Rutledge, London-New York, 1988, p. 16 ff.
15 NORRIE A., Crime, Reason and History. A Critical Introduction to Criminal 
Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2014, p. 335.
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incapacitation (based on the perpetrator’s social dangerousness, meant 
to protect society from further harm). Indeed, an evaluation of criminal 
dangerousness cannot but be based on past facts, in order to identify 
possible risks of future misbehaviour. Thus, if punishment is also aimed 
at protecting the society from the defendants’ possible reoffending, 
there is a shift, at sentencing, of the court’s attention from the acts the 
individuals were charged with, towards a prediction of other crimes 
that they may perpetrate in the future. This assumption is crucial to 
approach the topic of computational models of risk assessment that will 
be presented hereinafter.
On the other hand, along the process bringing the court to rule 
upon the defendants’ guilt, there may be other crucial decisions, based 
upon the facts of the proceeding. Arrest and early stage charges may 
trigger a judicial decision upon pre-trial detention, based on the need to 
prevent a list of specific risks.
Although there is no uniformity between jurisdictions, it is 
possible to argue that the risks traditionally tackled with pre-trial detention 
tend to be common to the whole area of the western legal tradition. 
Actually, the international bills of rights, such as art. 9 and 12 of the 
ICCPR and art. 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights, testify 
of such common approach.
In fact, it is a fundamental principle of modern law that 
limitations to liberty before the final assessment of the defendant’s 
culpability should be exceptional, based on exhaustive reasoning, in 
order to prevent unlawful anticipation of a possible penalty16. Such 
a principle is traditionally referred to the Magna Charta Libertatum, 
and the refusal of pre-trial release, in England and Wales, is still 
considered to be the solitary exception to the 1215 Bill of Rights.17 
In compliance with that ancient and well-regarded principle, pre-trial 
16 The issue of pre-trial detention and liberty was crucial in the English Medie-
val context, with circuit courts travelling around the country, hearing cases 
after long periods of time. It was up to the sheriff to rule upon the accused’s 
liberty pending trial (FANUELE C., La libertà su cauzione: unpalternativa alla 
custodia cautelare, Cedam, Padova, 2016, p. 136). 
17 CAVADINO P., GIBSON B., Bail, The Law, Best Practice and the Debate, Wa-
terside Press, Hook, 1993, p. 69.
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precautionary measures have been used «to support the main criminal 
process (the sole justification for the derogation from Magna Charta 
and Art. 5 ECHR)».18 Despite the huge divergence between national 
legal orders in terms of pre-trial detention regulation19 (not only due 
to the alternative common law / civil law), it is possible to argue that 
exceptions to the general rule of freedom before final conviction are 
meant to prevent risks for the trial to come20. Having said this, it is 
possible to argue that the main interference with liberty is the risk of 
flight: first and foremost, temporary forms of incapacitation aim to 
prevent the defendant from absconding and, therefore, jeopardising 
the prosecution and the proceedings. 
Although there is major inconsistency between western 
jurisdictions with regard to the defendant’s presence in court, 
preventing flight with precautionary measures is a common goal (the 
following references to Europe and U.S. are meant to point main areas 
of legal influence, as this paper is not based on a proper comparative 
research basis). Actually, despite being present in court is considered 
to be a fundamental right of the accused (art. 14 § 3 lett. d ICCPR; 
art. 6§1 and 3 ECHR, according to the interpretation by the ECtHR), 
in many legal orders, presence is also considered to be a duty and 
trial cannot take place without the defendant’s participation. From an 
historical standpoint, there is no clear distinction between common 
law and civil law countries21: while the former usually prescribe 
mandatory presence of the defendant, the latter vary a lot, with some 
18 VOGLER, R., England and Wales, p. 89.
19 For example, under the viewpoint of the prerequisites of pre-trial detention. 
Still valuable is ALSCHULER, A.W., Preventive Pre-Trial Detention and the 
Failure of Interest-balancing Approached to Due Process, Michigan Law Rev., 
1986, vol. 85, Issue 3, p. 520 ff., esp. 567, acknowledging that the failure of 
the 1984 Federal bail Reform Act to introduce proof of wrongdoing as a pre-
requisite of pre-trial detention rendered the Act unconstitutional («the stat-
utory language looks to the future rather than the past; importing a require-
ment of proof of past misconduct into this language seems impossible»).
20 TRIBE, L.H., An Ounce Of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John 
Mithcell, Virginia Law Review, 1970, vol. 56, p. 407, arguing that «an accusa-
tion of crime should not subject any man to imprisonment unless the govern-
ment’s need to prosecute him compels incarceration».
21 NEGRI D., L’imputato presente al processo, Giappichelli, Torino, 2014, p. 86 ff.
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jurisdiction, like Spain, prohibiting in absentia trials at the highest 
level, with a constitutional provision. Moreover, recent comparative 
studies22 proved that even in England and Wales there are nowadays 
major exceptions to the exclusion of in absentia trials, blurring the 
distinction between right and duty to be present at trial. Not only the 
defendant’s personal participation distinguishes between in absentia 
and in presence trials, it also plays major consequences upon the 
whole proceeding23, with specific regard to evidence, plea bargaining 
(and other diversion) decisions, compensation of damages and, of 
course, the possibility to enforce the final decision. For these reasons, 
preventing the defendant from absconding is a major commitment 
of every jurisdiction, regardless the value given to the defendant’s 
personal participation in trial. 
Moreover, pre-trial precautionary measures are also meant to 
prevent the accused from tampering with evidence.24
In Europe, the risk of foul play with evidence is considered to be 
a traditional ground for pre-trial detention, although art. 5 ECHR does 
not mention it explicitly. Art. 274 lett. a of the Italian code of criminal 
procedure is a paradigmatic example of how the risk of tampering evidence 
can be misinterpreted, in order to pursue an unlawful pressure upon the 
accused, with the purpose to overcome her right to keep silent. Generally 
speaking, when the defendants belong to criminal organisations, it is 
likely that European courts may presume a risk of evidence tampering, 
having regard to the capability of such organisations to interfere with 
witnesses and victims, intimidating them25. 
Even in the common law area and, in particular, in the US, 
according to § 3142 lett. f of the 1984 Bail Reform Act (in 1984 the Crime 
22 QUATTROCOLO S., RUGGERI S., Personal Participation in Criminal Pro-
ceedings, Springer, Cham, 2019, p. 458.
23 QUATTROCOLO S., RUGGERI S., Personal Participation, p. 461 ff.
24  RUGGERI S., Comparative analysis of pre-trial precautionary measures in 
criminal proceedings, in Ruggeri S., (ed), Liberty and Security in Europe, 
Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, Göttingen, 2013, p. 227.
25 JUNG S., PETRICK, C., SCHILLER E.M., MUNSTER, L., Developments in 
German Criminal Law: The Urgent Issues regarding Prolonged Pre-Trial De-
tention in Germany, German Criminal Law, 2021, p. 307 s.
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Control Act amended the 1966 Bail Reform Act: today, in federal criminal 
proceedings, release and detention determinations are still governed by 
§§ 3141-3156 of the 1984 Act), a detention hearing may be triggered by 
the government or the judicial officer when there is a serious risk that the 
defendant will obstruct justice, also by intimidating witness and jurors. In 
such circumstances, detention may be ordered if there is no condition or 
combination of conditions assuring the safety of any other person and the 
community26. In particular, an outdated but still interesting quantitative 
study upon pre-trial detention in several US circuits demonstrated that 
the risk of obstructing justice tends to outweigh other factors and variable 
in the application of pre-trial detention27. 
In these terms, the traditional function of pre-trial detention, i.e., 
supporting the main criminal process, seems to be a common feature, 
making sense of the exceptional circumstance of depriving individuals 
of their liberty, without a (final) assessment of their guilt. 
2.1. and the new security purpose
Yet, comparative studies established that, over the recent 
decades, many European jurisdictions departed from this tradition, 
to promote, instead, policing and social control goals.28 Analysing the 
reasons for enlarging the list of grounds for pre-trial detention would 
fall out of the scope if this paper. The reasons underpinning national 
criminal policies of pre-trial detention may be very difficult to grab and 
a whole comprehensive study would be needed to establish the causes 
of the reported phenomenon. For example, a regarded comparative 
American study considered the German reform of 1964, introducing 
a brand-new case of pretrial detention, based on the risk of serious 
offences, a consequence of the German accession to the ECHR. Although 
the accession did not imply the introduction of less liberal conditions, 
26 WILLIAMS J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial, p.264, p. 272.
27 WILLIAMS J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial, p. 298.
28 ORLANDI, R., Introduction, in RUGGERI S. (ed), Liberty and Security in 
Europe, Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, Göttingen, 2013, p. 10
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a new case of pre-trial detention was introduced for suspects having 
committed serious sex crimes29.
Despite the general acknowledgement of the presumption 
of innocence – recognised both in Europe and in the US – the trend 
mentioned above proved that, in recent years, the specific purposes 
distinguishing pre-trial detention from punishment tend to blur. Including 
new legal basis for precautionary measures, based on the need to prevent 
serious crimes, is not the only reason for anticipating the effect of penalty, 
via remand in custody and other interim measures. Among others, is the 
unreasonable length of criminal proceedings,30 certified in many States 
of the Council of Europe by the European Court of Human Rights (Italy 
above all others). Given that the causes for increasing the use of pre-trial 
detention are manifold, the consequence of such a trend was coherent, 
focusing the public opinion more on custody than on punishment, fostering 
the public expectation for an early and immediate deprivation of liberty, 
regardless the effective assessment of guilt and sentencing. The effect 
of this tendency is a major threat to the presumption of innocence,31 as 
testified by comprehensive literature on the topic.32
The same arguments seem to be valid for the U.S. too. Protecting 
the community was not a traditional task of pre-trial detention33 until 
the Eighties of the XX century. In 1984, the Bail Reform Act (see supra), 
introduced the ‘danger to the community’ as legitimate grounds for pre-
29 MEYER, H.H., Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, The Georgetown Law 
Journal, 1972, vol. 60, n. 6, p. 1469 ff.
30 ORLANDI R. Introduction, p. 11.
31 VOGLER R., England and Wales, p. 89: «nothing could do more damage to 
the adversarial principle that to imprison one adversary so that the logistical 
difficulties of the case preparation are magnified and he or she will appear in 
court robbed of any opportunity of appearing as an innocent person».
32 As to Spain, MORENO CATENA V., Spain, in S. Ruggeri (ed), Liberty and 
Security in Europe, Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, Göttingen, 2013, p. 154 ff.; 
as to Italy, see recently, DANIELE, M., Habeas Corpus. Manipolazioni di una 
garanzia, Giappichelli, Torino, 2017, p. 77 ff.; GREVI V., Libertà provvisoria 
ed esigenze di tutela ella collettività: una questione di legittimità costituzio-
nale, Giur.it., II, 1976, p. 633 ff. 
33 See extensively, WILLIAMS, J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial, p. 256 ff.; see also LO-
GAN KOEPKE J., ROBINSON D.G., Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the 
Future of Bail Reform, Washington Law Review, 2018, p. 1731 ff.
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trial detention34. In recent years, only a few States regulations of pre-trial 
detention refer exclusively to the consideration for court appearance.35 The 
US Supreme Court up-held this new task of remand in custody, stressing 
that «the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in 
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest».36 
Interestingly, in the quoted case of Salerno, the US Supreme Court came 
to a particular conclusion: based on the lack of intent to punish, pre-trial 
detention ordered at the detention hearing for the purpose of preventing 
crimes must be considered regulatory rather than punitive. Despite 
the criticism about such conclusion37, the Court never overruled that 
decision and prevention of (re?)offending became an accepted grounds 
for remand on custody.
2.2. how judges can forecast the suspects’ future behavior?
Given this general overview, the conclusion is that recent history 
of the western legal area demonstrates an expansion in the application of 
predictions in the field of precautionary measures, limiting individuals’ 
liberty before (and pending) trial. However, being exceptional, the 
decisions about pre-trail detention (and other coercive measures) must 
34 WILLIAMS, J.F., Classifying Pre-Trial, p. 257; ALSCHULER A.W., Preventive 
Pre-Trial Detention, p. 510 ff.
35 VAN NOSTRAND, M., Legal and Evidence Based Practices: Application of 
Legal Principles, Laws, and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services, 2007, 
Crime and Justice institute – National Institute of Corrections, US Dept. Of 
Justice, 2012, p. 2. 
36 US Supreme Court, US v. Salerno (decided on 26 May 1987), 481 U.S. 739. 
However, in that very same decision, Justice Rehnquist, signing the opin-
ion of the Court, stressed that «the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act 
clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provi-
sions as punishment for dangerous individuals» and that «in our society, lib-
erty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully 
limited exception. We hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception». 
37 There were dissenting opinions, arguing that the majority had overlooked 
the undeniable punitive element of pre-trial detention: see KISELBACH, D., 
Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: Preventive Detention and the Presumption of 
Innocence, in Criminal Law Quarterly, 1989, vol. 31, n. 2., p. 171.
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be justified by strong reasoning, in order to prevent abuses, as expressly 
provided by several domestic constitutions.38 And the more custody 
serves social security (rather than procedural) goals, the higher becomes 
the need for precise justification. But how can judicial authorities deliver 
precise reasoning about the risks of the suspect’s future behaviour?
Before we move any further into the topic of this paper, there 
are some important premises. First. As said, rules of criminal procedure 
seldom provide the decision maker with precise criteria for delivering 
an accurate risk assessment39: be it a matter of predicting the risk of 
absconding, or obstructing justice by tempering evidence, or committing 
a serious offence, judges are seldom equipped with valuable and accurate 
criteria to forecast the defendant’s future behaviour. Second. Even if the 
law or case-law provide for precise parameters, remand in custody and 
similar coercive measures are usually applied at an early stage of the 
proceedings, when the competent authorities have little information 
about both the facts that occurred and the suspect’s personality, as the 
file is still incomplete. 
In this scenario, two different solutions gained momentum. 
Traditionally, the difficulty of forecasting an individual’s future behaviour 
in pre-trial decisions has been tackled with presumptions. Although this 
should be the object of a specific comparative study, it is possible to argue, 
with some approximation, that the majority of the western legal orders 
recur to presumptions to establish the existence of a specific risk justifying 
detention (or other precautionary measures limiting liberty) before the 
assessment of guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. Such presumptions are 
various: They may be established by the law (see art. 275.3 of the Italian 
code of criminal procedure) or by consistent case-law40; they are often 
38 RUGGERI, S., Comparative Analysis, p. 230.
39 The Italian system, based on art. 274 lett. c ItCCP, provides for specific cri-
teria. To decide a pre-trial coercive measure, justified by the risk of offend-
ing, the judge must consider: specific circumstances of the fact (of which the 
individual is suspected); the suspect’s personality, based on her behaviour, 
deeds and record of previous convictions.
40 See JUNG, S., PETRICK, C., SCHILLER, E.M., MUNSTER L., Developments, 
p. 308, with regard to the attitude of German local courts to be satisfied with 
the circumstance that criminal organisations are likely to tamper with evi-
dence, taking advantage of their innate power of intimidating.
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rebuttable, but they may also imply some irrebuttable consequences (see, 
again, the example of art. 275.3 ItCCP, hereinafter). Generally speaking, 
legal presumptions hardly reconcile with the scheme of fair trial, reducing 
the space for an effective defence: if rebuttable, they reverse the burden 
of proof from the authorities upon the defendant, relieving the former 
from the duty of providing precise reasoning; if irrebuttable, they simply 
deprive the latter of the right to demonstrate the specificity of his/her own 
situation, excluding judicial authorities’ discretion and, thus, their duty 
to provide reasoning for their decisions. Moreover, the pre-trial context 
is a fluid one: investigation may introduce new elements, to change the 
scenario and presumptions are not compatible with it41. Such pattern 
appears to be particularly controversial with regard to pre-trial detention, 
as liberty is supposed to be the rule and incarceration or incapacitation 
an absolute exception…
As an alternative to traditional presumptions, models based 
on psycho-criminological, statistical theories also appear to offer a 
great support, giving the judicial reasoning the ‘fuel’ it needs, in the 
context of precautionary measures. Not only sentencing is a ‘natural’ 
scenario for risk assessment (manual or digital) tools (see § 4): detention 
hearings and other judicial decisions upon remand on custody (and 
other precautionary measures) became, more and more, the floor for 
predictions. And the more human decisions prove inconsistent, the more 
presumptions appear to violate individual’s right to a fair trial, the more 
the quantitative approach seems to be the solution. But is it a valuable 
solution? Let us reflect upon this. 
3. legal presumptIons In pre-trIal detentIon
Legal presumptions are a familiar concept in the European 
context. Given their ancient root in the Byzantine law42, presumptions 
became a common legal instrument in the Napoleonic period, in private 
41 CENTORAME, F., Presunzioni di pericolosità e coercizione cautelare, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, p. 115.
42 ANDRIOLI, V., Presunzioni (dir. proc. civ.), Novissimo Digesto Italiano, vol. 
XIII, Utet, Torino, 1966, p. 765 ff.
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law. According to art. 1349 of the Code Napoléon, presumptions are 
epistemological statements, implying that the judge can infer a specific 
unknown fact from a specific known fact43. 
Actually, the Napoleonian definition encompasses two different 
aspects44: legal presumptions, in which the ruler sets the boundaries of the 
link between the known fact and the unknown one; basic presumptions, 
praesumptiones hominis, allowing the judge to draw conclusions from 
common sense. For the purpose of this work, what is relevant is legal 
presumptions, whose purpose was, and still is, to limit the judicial discretion 
in the appreciation of evidence. Insofar, the purpose of presumptions 
appears very similar to that of mathematical models, as defined above, 
although the method is not: while models – may they be descriptive or 
normative – are based on a scientific theory attempting to reproduce reality, 
presumptions are based on a legal assumption, that may be not validated.
Without lingering upon historical aspects, it is possible to argue 
that legal presumptions almost lost their epistemic value as a consequence 
of the endorsement of b.a.r.d. and, in general, fair trial; however, an area in 
which legal presumptions did not lose momentum, is that of precautionary 
measures. Two cases appear very meaningful.
3.1. in italy
The Italian criminal justice system was completely renewed in 
1988, with a new code of criminal procedure. Abandoning the traditional 
inquisitorial scheme, the new code did not provide for legal presumptions 
in the field of pre-trial detention. Along with other provisions, art. 275 
ItCCP set forth a system of individualised judicial decisions, based on the 
need to satisfy specific requirements as to: i) proof of wrongdoing, and 
absence of excuses; ii) seriousness of the alleged misconduct; iii) existence 
of at least one specific risk among: evidence tampering; absconding; 
committing serious offences; iv) proportionality of the measure with the 
43 See art. 1349 Code Napoléon: « Les présomptions sont des conséquences que la 
loi ou le magistrat tire d’un fait connu à un fait inconnu».
44 DELVECCHIO, F., Presunzioni legali e rieducazione del condannato, 
Giappichelli, Torino 2002, p. 11.
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alleged misconduct; v) pre-trial detention as last resort measure, when 
no other conditions (or sets of measures) can reasonably prevent the risk 
under (iii). Each decision is triggered by a public prosecutor’s request and 
is delivered by a judge, along with specific reasoning: both the accused and 
the prosecutor may challenge the judicial decision, with specific means 
of appeal, before a court of merits and even before the Supreme Court.
In this context, art. 275.3 ItCCP was soon amended (by some 
urgent reforms, passed by the Government, and upheld by the Parliament, 
in 1991), in order to introduce a double presumption, for a list of organised 
crimes. With regard to such crimes, if there is proof of wrongdoing (i) 
and a risk in letting the suspect at large (iii), the judge must order pre-trial 
detention and pre-trial detention only, with a two-tier system: a rebuttable 
presumption (about wrong doing and risks: the accused is allowed to 
demonstrate that there is no proof, of the wrongdoing and of risk…) 
and an irrebuttable one. If the rebuttable presumption is not reversed by 
the accused, remand on custody will be ordered, as it is presumed that, 
given the accused’s affiliation to a criminal organisation, the sole effective 
measure is detention. The purpose of the amendment was to relieve judges 
from the duty to provide precise reasoning for remand in custody of 
members of powerful criminal organisations: setting a presumption would 
free the judge from a discretionary decision and, possibly, from the risk 
of retaliation. After a reduction, in 1995, the list of crimes implying the 
two-tier presumption was widely enlarged in 2009, with no connection 
to organised crime. Such trend triggered several appeals to the Italian 
Constitutional Court, that, in 2010, quashed the irrebuttable presumption, 
transforming it into a rebuttable one (with regard to some of the crimes 
enlisted in art. 275.3 ItCCP)45. The Court found several violations of the 
Italian Constitution: art. 3, establishing equal protection of individuals 
under the law (as to the lack of coherence in the list of offences triggering 
the presumptions); art. 13, setting forth the principle that liberty is the 
rule and pre-trial detention an extremely specific exception; art. 27, 
45 The literature about this topic is burgeoning. The core-concept is perfectly 
reported in the decision 265/2010 of the Italian Constitutional Court, which 
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providing that punishment must have a rehabilitation purpose (as to the 
punitive effect triggered by the presumption system).
At the time of writing, as a consequence of several others decision 
by the Constitutional Court and a series of amendments, the Italian rule 
about presumptions reads as follows: the original two-tier presumption 
still applies for three specific crimes (sedition, terrorism, affiliation to 
mafia organisations); in case of proof of wrongdoing, remand on custody 
is ordered, unless there is proof of no risk at all in leaving the suspect at 
large; for a (non-coherent) list of other crimes, there is a double rebuttable 
presumption, allowing the suspect to demonstrate: i) that there is no 
proof of wrongdoing or risk in being let at large; ii) if (i) is not reversed, 
other less punitive measures are suitable to balance the risk. 
As a matter of fact, Italy just reduced, but did not abandon, 
presumptions in the application of pre-trial detention, upholding even 
the arguable irrebuttable presumption for terrorism and affiliation to 
mafia: the internal debate, however, is far from being over46 and further 
interventions by the Constitutional Court have been envisaged47.
3.2. and in the u.s. federal order
For almost two centuries, the US federal system had established 
the right to bail for individuals accused of non -capital punishment 
crimes, based on their capability to provide sureties48. Traditionally, at 
the federal level, bail was ruled by three basic rules: bail should not be 
excessive; a right to bail exists in non-capital cases; bail is meant to assure 
46 GIULIANI, L., La libertà personale dell’imputato dopo la l. 16 aprile 2015, n. 
47, in Rivista di Diritto Processuale, 2017, p. 168.
47 ZACCHÉ, F., La libertà personale tra diritti della persona e nuove sfide del 
processo penale, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Procedura Penale, 2020, 2006 ff.; 
DANIELE, M., Habeas Corpus. Manipolazioni di una garanzia, Giappichelli, 
Torino, 2017, 108 ff.; Others value the irrebuttable presumption with re-
gard to terrorism: MANES, V., Lo ‘sciame di precedenti’ della Corte costi-
tuzionale sulle presunzioni in materia cautelare, in Diritto Penale e Processo, 
2014, p. 466. 
48 SCHNACKE, T. R., JONES, M. R., BROOKER, C.M.B, The History of Bail and 
Pretrial Release, Pretrial Justice Insititute, 2010; TONDI, V., Il bail. La libertà 
su cauzione negli ordinamenti anglosassoni, Cedam, Padova, 2016, p. 17.
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the presence of the accused at trial. However, as a matter of fact, the 
right to release was submitted to wealth49, although in accordance with 
the principle of non-excessive bail, set forth by the VIII Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. 
During the Sixties of the 20th century, the disappointment for a 
situation linking liberty to wealth was growing and under the initiative 
of the US Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, a National Conference on 
Bail and Criminal Justice was held in May 196450, paving the way to the 
1966 Bail Reform Act.
It is in the wake of such reform that, with the purpose to detach 
release from financial conditions, the attention started to be moved from 
the ends of justice to the needs of public interest (as openly stated by 
the 1966 Act itself). The trend grew over the decades, until in 1984 the 
standard of presumptive favour for release pending trial was replaced, 
with regard to serious offence, by the reverse presumption of custody51. 
According to the 1984 Bail reform act, two groups of conditions justify 
such reversal, introducing - like in the Italian experience – the presumption 
that only remand in custody is effective52. The so called ‘Previous Violator 
Presumption’53 and the ‘Drug and Firearm Offender Presumption’ have 
long been applied and are based on specific tests, daily applied by courts.
49 AUSTIN, A., The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release 
Rates, in Federal Probation, 2017, vol. 81, no. 1, p. 52.
50 SCHNACKE, T. R., JONES, M. R., BROOKER, C. M.B,: The History, p. 11.
51 A 1981 report from the Attorney General task force on violent crime con-
cluded that the 1966 Bail Reform Act should be amended in order to: deny 
bail to dangerous individuals; deny bail to individuals accused of serious 
crime, having already committed previous bail crimes; reversing, for serious 
crime, the presumption in favour of liberty (see AUSTIN A., The Presump-
tion, p. 52).
52 WILLIAMS F.J., Classifying Pre Trial, p. 268 ff.
53 The presumption applies to individuals charged with: any crime of violence 
or act of terrorism with a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 10 
years or more; any drug offense with a statutory maximum term of impris-
onment of 10 years or more; any felony involving a minor victim; any felony 
involving the use or possession of a firearm or destructive device; a charge 
for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender; any felony with a statutory maxi-
mum sentence of life or death; any felony if the defendant has at least two 
prior felony convictions for one of the above-noted offenses at the federal, 
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As said above, and unlike in the Italian jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court upheld this approach, approving both the shift of pre-trial detention 
towards goals of public security and the system of presumptions, which, 
however, have been recently scrutinised as possible grounds for the 
growing rates of pre-trial incarceration. As a matter of fact, since the 1984 
Act was enacted, rates of pre-trial detention grew in a constant manner 
(from 2000 to 2016 it grew up from 53 to 59 %)54, generating a number 
of concerns in both social and economic terms. It cannot be overlooked 
that, in 2016, the average pre-trial detention period was 255 days (over 
400 days in several districts), generating huge public expenditure. At the 
same time, the purpose of separating the right to release and personal 
financial situation could not be accomplished and the movement for bail 
reform is one rare area of bi-partisan agreement, pushing for abandoning 
monetary bail, in favour of effective management of risk.55In fact, given 
these premises, there are branches of legal research suggesting that 
presumptions should be replaced by solutions offering a more accurate 
and flexible representation of reality: models of pre-trial risk assessment.
4. What else, Instead of presumptIons?
As clarified above, models are based on quantitative and statistics 
approach, which relies on facts recurring in the past. Briefly, what 
repeatedly happened in the past is suitable to forecast what will happen 
in the future: given the definition reported in § 1, a model is one possible 
representation of reality, allowing to draw a prediction of incoming 
events. Each model is based on a theory aspiring to represent reality, in 
hard science as much as in social science.
state, or local level. However, the Previous Violator Presumption has three 
pre-conditions: Has the defendant a prior conviction that would trigger this 
presumption? Was that prior offense committed while the defendant was re-
leased on bail for an unrelated matter? Has less than five years passed from 
the date of conviction or from the defendant’s release for that conviction? 
If the three conditions are met, the Previous Violator Presumption applies.
54 AUSTIN, A. The Presumption, p. 53.
55 STEVENSON, M.T., Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, Minnesota Law Re-
view, 2018, p. 320.
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Moving from this assumption, it is possible to say that since 
the beginning of the 20th century a growing reliance on psychology and 
sociology boosted expectations in the prediction of individuals’ future 
behaviour and in the possibility to prevent reoffending by those who had 
already been sentenced. However, the discussion led to very different 
results in Europe and the US, due to a different attitude towards social 
science and specific approaches to the rule of law56.
4.1. continental europe and the german moderne schule
As to Europe, the beginning of the last century experienced the 
clash between the ‘classic’ penological ideology, based on retribution, 
and the so-called positivistic ideology, promoted in particular by the 
German Moderne Schule. This was inspired by the ideal that criminal law 
is a form of social control, and thus promoted a preventative purpose for 
the penalty57. Such a theoretical trend is often defined, in the continental 
literature, as ‘utilitarian-functionalist’,58 after Jeremy Bentham’s 
traditional paradigm.59 In fact, this approach tends to curb criminal 
law into an instrument to achieve a specific result, i.e., social control. 
In this view, culpability, the traditional foundation for penalty,60 may 
turn out to be incompatible with the purpose of maintaining (or restore) 
56 PIFFERI M., Individualisation of Punishment and the Rule of Law: Reshaping 
Legality in the United States and in Europe between the 19th and 20th Centu-
ry, American Journal of Legal History 2012, p. 326.
57 PELISSERO, M., Pericolosità sociale e doppio binario. Vecchi e nuovi modelli 
di incapacitazione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008, p. XIV.
58 BARTOLI, R., Colpevolezza tra personalismo e prevenzione, Giappichelli To-
rino, 2005, p. 43.
59 Although Bentham, in his theories about punishment, was very clear in re-
jecting unjust sanctions. As punishment is always evil, it can be accepted only 
if the offender’s suffering can spare major suffering to others. TONRY, M., 
Sentencing and Prediction. Old Wine in Old Bottles, in DE KEIJSER, J.W, 
ROBERTS, J.V., RYBERG J., Predictive Sentencing. Normative and empirical 
perspective, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019, p. 284.
60 The principle of culpability is the premise of the state’s power to punish: 
KAUFMANN A., Das Schuldprinzip, Winter, Heidelberg, 1961, p. 15 ff.
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social order,61 troubled by crime. Several continental jurisdictions, 
were influenced by the so called ‘positive school’, and adopted a two-
toer system, based on both penalties and correctional measures, the 
first being proportional to the act, the second to the social risk posed 
by the convicted62. Actually, such distinction provided for the clear 
distinction between desert and dangerousness, giving the latter its 
own specific relevance in the criminological theory. As a result of this 
distinction, the majority of the European jurisdictions confirmed the 
tradition of establishing minimum and maximum sentences with regard 
to every offence,63 while common law systems stuck to the tradition of 
undetermined sentences, making sentencing a process detached from 
criminal law rules and principles.64
4.2. the us and undetermined sentencing
In fact, in the US, the debate about individualisation of punishment 
pushed the system towards undetermined sentencing, moving the discretion 
about the period of detention from courts to boards of experts65. This trend 
had been theorised in the ‘70s of the 19th century, but was not generally 
accepted: in fact, it appeared inconstant with the traditional principles of 
nulla poena and punitur quia peccatum est66. First, the traditional balance 
between legislative, judicial and administrative powers was in jeopardy: 
not only would the undetermined sentence deprive the Parliament of 
the power to establish minimum and maximum penalties (as provided 
by the Constitution), but it would also replace the judicial discretion in 
61 JACOBS, G., Das Schuldprinzip, in Rheinische-Westfälische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Vorträge G 319, 1993, p. 8.
62 For an interesting overview on how the U.S. Sentencing Commission tried to 
reconcile these two paradigms: DUBBER M.D., HÖRNLE T., Criminal Law. A 
Comparative Approach, OUP, Oxford, 2016, p. 9.
63 PIFFERI M., Individualisation, p. 355. 
64 See NORRIE A., Crime, Reason, p. 334: «Once we get beyond the conviction 
of the accused, the rules and principles of the criminal law tend to evaporate 
and the system becomes much more discretionary and less regulated by law».
65 PIFFERI M., Individualisation, p. 338.
66 For a general overview, FRIEDMAN L.M., Crime and Punishment in Ameri-
can History, Basic Books, New York, 1994, pp. 159 ff., 304 ff.
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sentencing, with an administrative board’s arbitrariness, departing from 
the general principles of criminal law. Second, the fundamental beacon 
of the whole of Western ideology, free will, seemed to be under attack. 
Guilt and punishment were shifted from culpability (i.e. blameworthiness 
of one’s own free behaviour) to the field of the offender’s character and 
criminological type. 
However, there was bitter criticism about the criminal 
justice system of the time. The US was experiencing massive distress 
because of patent differences in sentencing among federal States. 
Legal historians report a huge concern for bias and the arbitrariness of 
courts, scarcely directed by local criminal rules in the overwhelming 
duty of determining criminal sanctions. Against this backdrop, the 
proposal of allocating sentencing to experts’ boards, operating on the 
basis of one common index, i.e. science, turned out to be successful. 
The opinion that delivering the sentence and its periodical review were 
to be considered, more correctly, administrative duties, rather than 
judicial, gained momentum, suggesting that they should be performed 
by an administrative body,67 with no need of specific Constitutional 
amendments: the law still provided for a minimum and maximum 
sentence and courts still had the power to assess guilt, for the sake of 
the rule of law…68 Apparently, this was enough to overcome the fear of 
‘administrativisation’ of criminal justice, which occurred with a general 
spreading of progressive treatment and experts’ boards, by the 20’s of 
the 20th century. This was to become a benchmark, distinguishing the 
US and the European continental tradition.
In the U.S., the 20th century became the flourishing era of 
predictive sentencing, boosting psycho-criminological research upon the 
risk of violent behaviour and recidivism. These were the origins of risk 
assessment, and they explain why the latter has always been associated 
with incapacitation, in a paradigm of removal of dangerous individuals 
from society, until a full recovery from dangerousness.
67 Woods v. State,130Tenn.100,114(1914).
68 WARNER C.D., Some aspects of the indeterminate sentence, Yale Law Jour-
nal, 1899, p. 222.
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4.3. the dawn of risk assessment tools
Since those moments on, risk assessment is the main instrument 
for evaluating potential re-offending. The term is not specific at all, as it is 
used in many different technical and scientific areas. However, it is in the 
criminal justice setting that it received the most contradictory reactions69. 
Nevertheless, it has become crucial in several areas of decision-making, 
both at the pre-trial stage, sentencing and parole, and also in the follow-
up of psychiatric situations.70
Moving from the speculation that “nothing predicts behaviour 
like (or better than) previous behaviour”71, “such tools include a set of 
risk factors, which may or may not be weighted, to provide a classification 
of risk (high, medium, low) a probabilistic score (i.e., a percentage 
probability of re-offending within a certain timeframe) or both”.72 As 
seen above, both in general and in specific forensic terms, the matter is 
the validation of methods and instruments, that must obtain acceptance 
by the scientific community.
As risk always entails uncertainty73, identifying risk factors is 
the first challenge for scholars and practitioners in the field. Criminal 
behaviours have multiple causation factors and an offender’s risk 
assessment always take into account the interaction of several factors. 
A second fundamental step in understanding risk assessment is the 
relationship between the group and the individual. Social sciences collect 
statistical data to elaborate general conclusions, applicable to groups of 
cases. The ‘G2I’ (Group to Individual) paradigm is at the core of the 
debate about forensic predictive tools. Prediction of future behaviour can 
69 ZARA, G, FARRINGTON, D.P., Criminal Recidivism: explanation, prediction 
and prevention. Rutledge, Oxon, 2016, p. 148. 
70 See ZARA, G., FARRINGTON D.P., Criminal Recidivism, p. 150.
71  KVARACEUS, W.C., Anxious Youth: Dynamics of Delinquency, Columbus, 
Charles E. Merrill Publ., 1966, p. 53,
72 FAZE,L S., The Scientific Validity of Current Approaches to Violence and 
Criminal Risk Assessment, in DE KEIJSER J.W., ROBERTS, J.V., RYBERG,J, 
Predictive Sentencing, Normative and empirical perspective, Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford, 2019, p. 197.
73 GIGERENZER, G., Rationality for Morals, OUP, Oxford, 2008, passim.
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only be based on the observation of a group, and is a function of group 
outcomes: let us see how deeply the G2I effect may affect the reliability 
of a risk assessment model.
The first step of any risk assessment model is listing causational 
factors triggering criminal behaviour. Risk factors are usually divided into 
two groups: static and dynamic. The first do not change, or change in 
only one possible direction (e.g. age). The latter (dynamic) may change 
according to the individual’s situation and they include criminogenic 
needs, i.e. aspects of a person, or her personal conditions that, when 
changing, may set off a variation in her criminal behaviour. There is no 
evidence that either static or dynamic factors are more reliable indicators 
of risk: both insufficient per se, they must be taken into account jointly, 
for a successful assessment. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic that a tool 
may consider every possible risk factor74: nevertheless, this fact does not 
prevent models of risk assessment to be reliable. 
The accuracy of a scientific prediction is based on the largest 
sample possible, i.e., the greatest number of cases examined. In particular, 
a forensic prediction is reliable if it correctly demonstrates the individual’s 
propensity to re-offend. Here the G2I factor steps in: the scale of these 
two evaluations (suitability and adequacy of the sample; reliability of the 
prediction with regard to a specific individual) is different and, for this 
reason, risk assessment is often criticised for its inaccuracy in translating 
group phenomena into individual instances75… As said above, models are 
not the mirror of reality, they only aspire to describe reality. 
One factor may have a relevant impact on the G2I factor. The 
instruments to enact practical, individual risk assessment may be different, 
due to the approach they use in translating psycho-criminological theories 
into a personal evaluation. One main, traditional, distinction is between 
actuarial instruments and clinical, professional, judgment instruments. 
For a basic distinction, it is possible to say that actuarial instruments 
address historical and static risk factors, while professional judgment 
instruments take into account dynamic risk factors. While the professional 
approach encompasses the professional’s experience and intuition – but, 
74 ZARA, G. FARRINGTON D.P., Criminal Recidivism, p. 155.
75 REDMAYNE. M., Character in Criminal Trial, OUP, Oxford, 2015, p. 258.
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also her unconscious bias - the static risk evaluations tend to portray an 
individual as unchangeable, without taking into account the effect of a 
possible evolution in her condition, influencing the risk of (re)offending.
4.4. pre-trial risk assessment tools: the ptra
As mentioned above, in the US, the high dissatisfaction with 
pretrial incarceration rates set possible alternatives to presumptions 
under the spotlight. Based on the large experience gathered in the realm 
of sentencing and parole risk assessment tools, several solutions have 
been tailored for both the federal and the local level. 
At the federal level, the Probation and Pretrial Service Office, 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, assigned Christopher Lowenkamp 
with the design of a specific tool, meant to assist pre-trial federal officers 
in preparing recommendation before detention hearings76: in 2010 he 
released the Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (PTRA), which is extensively 
used, and regularly revised, in order to re-assess its validation77.
The instrument is actuarial, based on large archive data, originally 
encompassing 200.000 federal cases of release, from 2001 to 2007. The 
instrument rates the defendant’s risk of failure to appear (FTA), rearrest 
for new criminal activity, pretrial revocation of release.
Inspired by regression modelling techniques, the PTRA algorithm 
is based on 11 parameters that, according to Lowenkamp’s theory, 
accurately score the individual’s specific pre-trial risk. Such parameters 
are: defendant’s criminal history (number of felony convictions; prior 
failure to appear; pending felonies and misdemeanors); instant conviction 
offence (type and class); age, educational achievements; employment 
status; residential location and ownership; problems of drug or other 
substance abuse; citizenship status. Given these data, the tool scores 
suspects in a range of five risk categories, from 0 to 15, predicting the 
likelihood that the they commit pre-trial violations.
76 AUSTIN, A., The Presumption, p. 54.
77 COHEN, T.H., LOWENKAMP, C.T., HICKS, W.E., Revalidation the Federal 
Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (PTRA): A Research Summary, Federal 
Probation, 2018, vol. 82, n. 2, p. 23 ff.
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This brand-new instrument was set in the hands of federal pre-
trial officers (civil servants who, according to § 1354 of the bail Reform 
Act, are in charge of collecting, verifying and reporting judicial officials 
on information about the risks posed by a defendant in terms of flight 
and social danger). In 2014, only half of the pre-trial reports handled by 
pre-trial officers to judicial officials was based on PTRA, while in more 
recent years, the use became larger78.
4.5. and the psa
As to local dimension, one tool is widely used in the US, in pre-
trial detention and release decisions79: 28 jurisdictions (and among them 
three States)80 use the Public Safety Assessment (PSA)81 to assist the judge 
in the decision about the risks of leaving the accused at large, before trial. 
The software was developed in 2013 and, according to the institution 
that promoted it (the Laura and John Arnold Foundation)82, it is useful 
in reducing the number of individuals detained before trial.83 Based on 
78 COHEN, T.H., LOWENKAMP, C.T., HICKS, W.E., Revalidating, p. 29.
79 KEHL, D., GUO, P., KESSLER, S., Algorithms in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: Assessing the Use of risk Assessments in Sentencing, Responsive 
Communities Initiative, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Har-
vard Law School, 2017, available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.In-
stRepos:33746041, p. 10.
80 PSA was developed and piloted in Kentucky. Before the instrument was re-
leased, a local law (House Bill, 463, 2011) made the use of risk assessment 
mandatory in bail decisions. Since its launch in 2013, PSA spread to other 27 
jurisdictions (among which, 2 other States) and has been pointed out as the 
scheme for a general bail review bill (Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act), pre-
sented in 2017 at the US Senate by Senators Kamala D. Harris (dem.) and Rand 
Paul (rep.) (read their opinion at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/
opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html).
81 https://www.psapretrial.org/about/background
82 The foundation was established in 2010 by Laura (an attorney and former oil 
company executive), and John (an investor) Arnold.
83 https://www.psapretrial.org/about/background. However, STEVENSON, 
M.T., Assessing Risk Assessment, p. 305, highlights that arguments and ‘facts’ 
usually reported in the discussion about risk assessment stem form non-aca-
demic reports by the agencies that designed the instruments.
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9 factors,84 the instrument is actuarial, relying on the individual’s age, 
current charge and criminal history: race, ethnicity and geography are 
not taken into consideration as, according to the designers, they would 
not improve accuracy in prediction. The instrument is said to having been 
created on the basis of the largest dataset ever collected, i.e. 750.000 cases, 
from about 300 jurisdictions: according to the designers, this makes it a 
nationally-wide validated tool.
The tool does not need an interview with the accused: the 
information can be taken out of her criminal record and other general 
record accessible to the public authority. Based on algorithms tailored 
to purpose, the tool produces a scale of the individual’s risk under three 
different parameters (FTA, Failure To Appear; NCA, New Criminal 
Activity; NVCA, New Violent Criminal Activity), that can be used by a 
judge or a court, along with the so-called Decision-Framework,85 to decide 
whether the arrested will be released or detained. The peculiarity of this 
instrument is the ability to deliver a ‘Failure To Appear’ index. The risk 
factors considered by PSA under this parameter are: Pending charge at 
the time of offense (Y/N); Prior conviction (Y/N); Prior failure to appear 
in the past 2 years (No/Once/2 or more times); Prior failure to appear, 
older than 2 years (Y/N).
The more traditional monetary bail proved discriminatory 
towards the poorest social groups86 (and, thus, potentially in breach of 
the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution),87 the quicker this 
84 Age at current arrest; Current violent offense (current violent offense and 
20 yrs. old or younger); Pending charge at the time of the offense; Prior 
misdemeanor conviction; Prior felony conviction (prior conviction [misde-
meanor or felony]); Prior violent conviction; Prior failure to appear in the 
past two years; Prior failure to appear older than two years; Prior sentence to 
incarceration
85 https://www.psapretrial.org/implementation/guides/managing-risk/
guide-to-the-pretrial-decision-framework. According to the text, «the PSA is 
used to measure a person’s pretrial risk, whereas the DF is used to help man-
age that risk»
86 See Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, Moving Beyond 
Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, 2016, Harvard Law School, 6 ff.
87 The Eight Amendment prohibits “excessive bail”, but, unfortunately, it does 
not define the meaning of ‘excessive’.
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pretrial risk assessment tool spread around the US88, pushed by a strong 
movement for reforming bail throughout the US, prioritising effective risk 
management over monetary bonds, and gaining momentum in pretrial 
services programs, focusing both on release and diversion.89
There are few studies focusing on the real impact of the use of 
pretrial risk assessment. Some researchers have highlighted that the effects 
of it are scarce and not permanent.90 Given that pretrial risk assessment 
is a relatively new trend, based on the recent mistrust and critique of 
traditional monetary bail bonds, its advocate argue that the burdensome, 
awful, monetary bond may prove useless in bail decisions, if «in principle 
an algorithm could also make these predictions. Just as pixel patterns can 
be used to predict presence of a face, information about the defendant 
and their case could be used to predict flight or public safety risk»91.
What is radically new, in the two pre-trial risk assessment models 
presented here, is the FTA index. I reported above the factors that PTRA 
and PSA consider to be relevant for the evaluation of the individual’s 
propensity to abscond. However, apparently there is no comprehensive 
and fully independent literature about the meaningfulness of those 
factors in terms of effective risk of flight. While criminogenic factors at 
the basis of sentencing risk assessment have been widely discussed by 
scholars, over the last century, at least, it seems to me that there is no 
sufficiently convincing academic literature demonstrating the relevance 
of the FTA factors. On the one hand, it is important to understand if and 
how judges apply the PSA report, taking into account first instance and 
88 STEVENSON M.T., Assessing Risk Assessment, p. 307.
89 VAN NOSTRAND M., Legal and Evidence, p. 2.
90 Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment, p. 308 f., argues that the effect of the 
reform passed in Kentucky was an immediate boost in non-monetary release 
and, in general, an increase in release of moderate-risk accused. Neverthe-
less, in the following two years, the effect was reversed and the remand on 
custody rates became higher than they were before the reform. The intro-
duction of PSA had no significant results in terms of release rates ad it seems 
that only 29% of arrested are released on non-monetary bond at the first 
bail setting. 
91 KLEINBERG J. ET ALII, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018, p. 240.
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appeal pre-trial decisions92. On the other hand, there is a lack of literature 
demonstrating that the incorporation of those factors into an actuarial 
instrument can outperform the judge’s individual evaluation. Secondly, 
it turns out to be complicated for scholars, to compare algorithmic 
pretrial risk assessment tools with judicial decisions, because of the 
ambiguity of judges’ predictions. In fact, a defendant can be remanded 
in custody both because the judge estimated a high risk of absconding 
(or offending), or simply because the judge overestimated her ability 
to pay, establishing a bond that she cannot afford. Moreover, the judge’s 
individual evaluation can be influenced by factors other than risk, such 
as proportion with the current charge, notwithstanding a high score 
in risk of absconding or offending.93 Thus, only a rough proxy can be 
used as a measure of human performance in estimating pretrial risk…94 
Taking into account all these arguments, scholars have argued that it is 
unclear whether digital pretrial risk assessment tools really outperform 
humans at predicting pretrial risks95. However, I suggest to move the 
spotlight from the specific aspect of measuring if and how much pre-trial 
risk assessment models can outperform humans in detecting real risk, 
to a different issue: how can pre-trial measure decisions become more 
compliant with the presumption of innocence?
92 MINDE, B. D., FARRELL E.A., The Role of Public Safety Assessment in Pretri-
al Detention, New Jersey Lawyer, 2019, n. 318, p. 29 ff. report of several New 
Jersey cases of court’s criticism about PSA reports.
93 It is worth remembering that some jurisdiction (e.g. the Italian one), provide 
for a specific principle of proportionality, in pretrial coercive measures, be-
tween the offence the arrested is charged with and the measure to be applied. 
The first index to be considered by the judge is proportionality to the current 
charge and the second is adequacy to the effective risk of the case (of ab-
sconding, or tampering with evidence, or offending), being detention being 
the last resort.
94 STEVENSON, M.T., Assessing Risk Assessment, p. 324.
95 STEVENSON, M.T., Assessing Risk Assessment, p. 325. Moreover, due to the 
fact that instruments like PSA are based solely on information taken out of 
files and records, with no need for an interview with the defendant, some 
have criticised their structure. It sounds contradictory to claim for reform of 
the bail system by suggesting instruments that are completely based on data 
pulled from the system under reform itself: LOGAN KOEPKE J., ROBINSON 
D.G., Danger Ahead, p. 1751.
1888 | QUaTTrocolo, Serena.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 3, p. 1859-1896, set.-dez. 2021. 
5. conclusIons
The idea at the basis of this paper is that the purpose of taking 
advantage of the recent digital turn to design pre-trial risk assessment 
tools is just a modern attempt to tackle the same, old problems of 
justifying pre-trial detention decisions, against the backdrop of the 
presumption of innocence.
In the wake of the so-called fourth revolution, the scholars’ duty 
is to consider, neutrally, how the two different methods perform. On the 
one hand, traditional presumptions of pre-trial risks have been recently 
coupled, in the U.S. criminal justice system, with actuarial risk assessment 
tools, meant to deliver accurate and individual predictions about the 
suspect’s future behaviour. As reported by a recent study, PTRA proved 
much more nuanced and effective in identifying high risk suspects than 
traditional presumptions, the latter being «a poorly defined attempt to 
identify high-risk defendants based primarily on their charge, relying on 
the belief that a defendant’s charge was a good proxi for that defendant’s 
risk»96. Nuanced and effective, rather than outperforming, appears to be 
much more appropriate terms to face the challenge of reconciling pre-
trial detention with the presumption of innocence…
On the other hand, Italy is an example of persistence in pre-trial 
detention presumptions, even if the Constitutional Court triggered a trend 
of strong reduction of the irrebuttable presumption. No others solutions 
have been envisaged so far and I do not suggest that actuarial instruments 
may be the solution. However, what these two different experiences 
demonstrate is that the legal standards set by rulers and courts for pre-
trial risks forecast cannot but be general. Nevertheless, both the basic 
principles of fair trial and reality proved that an accurate prediction is an 
individualised one, which can hardly be performed on the basis of the sole 
legal standards. This is demonstrated by the recent Italian reform, of 2015, 
meant to reinforce the judicial duty to give extremely precise reasoning 
of pre-trial measures: as a matter of fact, listing long catalogues of checks 
and balances that judges must report in their decisions did not improve 
the quality of the judicial control over pre-trial coercive measures97 and 
96 AUSTIN, A., The Presumption, p. 60.
97 ZACCHÉ, F., La libertà, p. 2004.
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did not reduce neither the rates of pre-trial detention, nor the number 
of pre-trial measures appeals. Forecasting one of the traditional pre-trial 
risks is a matter of being provided with complete, updated, accurate 
information about the suspects and their personal environment. Such 
prediction cannot be based on normative assumptions rather than on 
factual data and for these reasons, presumptions cannot fulfil the task. 
Can actuarial pre-trial risk assessment tools do it? In previous 
occasions I stated that, as to the Italian legal system, such instruments 
should not be used, neither in trial nor at the pre-trial stage, due to the 
general provision of art. 220.2 ItCCP, prohibiting the use of psycho-
criminological expertise before sentencing. Although still convinced 
of that belief, I must admit that reflecting upon the topic of this paper, 
I started approaching the idea that more accurate decisions in pre-trial 
coercive measures do not depend on better legal formulas, rather than 
more informed judicial decisions. Given the crucial role of judges’ 
discretion in every single case (and the paramount importance of a 
detailed reasoning), non-normative standards may guide them in a more 
individualised decision, possibly reducing pre-trial incarceration rates, 
provided that those standards are accurate, validated and are not used 
to rule out the duty of an exhaustive reasoning98.
Actually, besides risk assessment tools, the recent digital turn 
can offer wide range information about suspects, that may turn out to be 
particularly useful in pre-trial detention decisions, when the file is slim 
and the judge has no personal acknowledgment of the suspect’s personal 
conditions, especially in those legal orders, such as Italy, in which there 
is no contact between judges and suspects, before the decision upon pre-
trial measures is taken. Having more information about the individual 
under investigation, the judge could, e.g., better understand that, due to 
her special family conditions, it is extremely unlikely that the defendant 
may flee. And digital analytics may certainly help in tracing a complete 
profile of the suspect.
98 Daniele, M., Il diritto alla libertà personale e le manipolazioni dell’habeas 
corpus, in Negri D., Zilletti L. (eds.), Nei limiti della Costituzione. Il codice 
repubblicano e il processo penale contemporaneo, Cedam, Padova, 2019, p. 
221: the Author forecasts a scenario in which pre-trial risk assessment tools 
may rule out or reduce the impact of reasoning in pre-trial decisions.
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However, we should wonder how this impacts on the presumption 
of innocence: should we assume that a more informed decision, based 
on a digital analysis of data, necessarily affects such presumption? 
Actually, the correct point of view seems to be the one mentioned at the 
beginning. It has been largely acknowledged that the limit of compliance 
of pre-trial coercive measures with the presumption of innocence is the 
specific purpose of such measures. As far as they are meant to avoid 
disruptions in the procedure, such as tampering with evidence or flight, 
they have been largely accepted99 as compliant with the presumption of 
innocence. In the same way, the use of digital solutions for the decision 
upon such measures does not add, in my opinion, specific risks for 
the presumption of innocence, as far as such purpose is respected. In 
fact, as it has also been empirically demonstrated100, the major area of 
infringement of the presumption of innocence derives from the use of 
pre-trial detention as a means of prevention of crime101, for purposes 
of social security.
Given that pre-trial risk assessment tools appear to be deprived 
of evidence-based reliability with regard to the prediction of the risk of 
tampering and fleeing, digital instruments providing pre-trial judges with 
more information to consider, do not seem to impinge, negatively, on the 
suspect’s presumption of innocence. However, a basic condition for this 
assumption is the reliability and the neutrality of such information, which 
99 See however the provoking opinion by Duff, A., Pre-Trial Detention and the 
Presumption of Innocence, in Ashworth A., Zedner L., Tomlin P. (Eds.), Pre-
vention and the Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013, p. 115 ff. For a general overview upon the relationship between pre-
sumption of innocence and the persistent trend to extend the use of pre-trial 
detention: STEVENS, l., Pre-Trial Detention: The Presumption of Innocence 
and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights Cannot and 
Does Not Limit Its Increasing Use,  in European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, Issue 2 (2009), pp. 165 ff.; MEYERS, N.M., 
Eroding the Presumption of Innocence: Pre-Trial Detention and the Use of 
Conditional Release on Bail, in British Journal of Criminology, 2017, pp. 664 ff.
100 STEVENS, L., The meaning of the presumption of innocence for pre-trial 
detention: An empirical approach, 42(3) Netherland Journal of Legal Philos-
ophy, 2013, 239-248, p. 242.
101 See recently, MAZZA, O., La presunzione di innocenza messa alla prova, in 
La giustizia penale, 2019, 181 ss.
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should be assessed; moreover, software processing such information must 
be tailored for the specific purpose of being used in criminal proceedings, 
with specific attention to fundamental rights. 
Providing judges with accurate information may induce a trend 
reducing the need to use presumptions and pre-trial risk assessment tools, 
leading to a more accurate (and less generalised) application of coercive 
measures. In this sense, such solution may have, on the contrary, a positive 
impact on the presumption of innocence. Reaffirming that remand in 
custody is applied only when specific circumstances highlight a specific 
risk for the proceeding may foster the feeling, in the public opinion, that 
pre-trial measures are not an anticipation of penalties, rather restrictions 
carefully used to succeed in leading an accurate criminal proceeding.
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